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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff and Apellant,
vs.
OP AL JOHNSON, individually and
as Administratrix of the Estate of
Cl~-de W. Johnson, deceased,
Drf endant and Respondent.

Case No.

11159

BRIEF O,F APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be ref erred to as they appeared in
the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff commenced this suit to cancel a policy of
insurance obtained by false and fraudulent representations. Defendant counterclaimed for recovery of insurance benefits under the policy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint an<l
awarded judgment on the counterclaim.
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RELIEF ROUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the judgment of
the trial court, directing judgment on plaintiff's complaint
and dismissing the counterclaim or, in the alternative,
a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff commenced this suit to cancel a policy of
insurance issued to Clyde W. Johnson in September,
1965. The action is grounded upon the contention that
the policy was obtained by false and fraudulent representations. Clyde W. Johnson and his survivors claim
death benefits and hospital and mrdical benefits under
the policy. Defendant counterclaimed for recovery of
these benefits.
There is no material conflict as to the facts of the
case. The pre-trial order sets forth the uncontroverted
facts and the contentions of the parties (R. 48-50). The
trial court adopted by reference the entire statement of
unconroverted facts as a part of his findings of fact (R.
56).
The cause was tried non-jury and the testimony of
witnesses was offered by the respective parties to supplement the statement of uncontroverted facts. The defendant concedes that the insured Clyde \V. .Johnson
falselv answered concerning his health in the application
for i~surance. The principal defense asserted was that
the plaintiff had issued two prior policies to the insured,
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each of which contained certain "incontestable" clause:,;
and that the clauses of the prior policies should bar the
plaintiff's action for cancellation of the policy in question.
The trial court by his memorandum decision and by
his conclusions of law held that the "incontestable" provisions contained in the earlier policies "carried over
and became effective provisions of the policy issued on
fleptember 3, 1965, WP2 510 001 and, therefore, the
benefits under said policy were in full force and effect."
On or about October 17, 1957, the plaintiff's insurance agent, Mr. Niles M. Wing, received an application
from Mr. Johnson pursuant to which a policy of insurance was issued. This policy, known as an Employer's
Security Policy, provided certain health, hospital and
surgical benefits. One eligibility requirement for the issuance of the policy was that the policy be issued to an
Pmployer of at least three persons. Mr. Johnson later
became ineligible for this coverage because of a reduction in the number of employees retained by him. The
coverage of the first policy was therefore cancelled in
1960 (Tr. 32).
Upon the reconunendation of Mr. Wing, a new polic.v
was issued February 2, 1960. The new policy, known as
a Gibraltar 325 policy, provided health, hospital and
surgical benefits. It did not provide any life insurance
or major medical coverage (Tr. 32-33). This policy remained in force until the policy now in question wa::.
issued by the plaintiff.
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In the spring of 1965, Mr. Johnson's firm was employing sufficient employees to again qualify for an
Employer's Security Policy. As Mr. Johnson's insurance
agent, Mr. -Wing contacted ,Johnson and suggested to
him that he consider taking out the Employer's Security
Policy. The basis for the recommendation was that the
new policy would provide life insurance coverage, and
would also provide major medical expense which would
take care of catastrophe-type sickness or accident (Tr.
34). Application for the new policy was made September 3, 1965 and the policy was issued by Prudential pursuant to this application.
At the time the new application was made, the agent
explained to J olmson that this would be a ''brand new
policy" (Tr. 46-47).
Mr. Johnson's application was made on a form provided by the company (received in evidence as Exhibit
2); was completed in the handwriting of the company's
agent, Niles M. Wing, and was signed by Mr. Johnson
in the presence of the agent. As a part of the taking of
the application, the agent read to Mr. Johnson the following questions to which Mr. Johnson answered as follows (Part II, Paragraph 2(a), (b), (c) and (d)):
(a) Have you at any time been treated for
or heen told you had trouble with any of the
following: .. : heart, high blood pressure .... 1
Answer: No.
(b) Have you been in any hospi~al or .other
institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or
treatment during the past five years~
Answer: No.
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( c) Have you been examined by or consulted
a physician during the past five years~
Answer: No.
( d) Have you any known physical impairments or ill health not covered by the answers
through 2(a) to 2(c) . . . .
Answer: No.
The agent testified positively that each of these
questions was read to Mr. Johnson and that to each
separate question Mr. Johnson answered "No" (Tr. 37::39). The application was submitted to the underwriting
department of the insurance company and no physical
t~xamination was required. The application was approved
and Policy No. WP2 510 001 was issued insuring Clyde
W. Johnson.
The testimony of K. E. Noyes, M.D., family physician of Clyde W. Johnson, was that in 1964 prior to the
making of the application, Dr. Noyes had treated Mr.
John son for heart failure; had advised the patient of
his serious heart condition and had instructed him to
"slow down" and to discontinue certain parts of his work.
The significant particulars of Dr. Noyes' testimony are as
follows:
On March 16, 1964, Mr. Clyde Johnson saw Dr.
Noyes with complaints of shortness of breath and swelling of the ankles. The doctor took a history from Mr .
.Johnson and examined him to diagnose his malady (Tr.
fi). The doctor's notes show that the patient "has had
rheumatic mitral valve lesions for many years" (Tr.
27-28). Dr. Noyes' examination disclosed that he had a
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heart rate of 100; that the patient's heart was enlarged;
and that he had both systolic and diastolic murmers. The
doctor concluded that he was suffering from double mitral
valvular lesions and that the heart was "fibrillating"
(Tr. 6-10).
The doctor testified that the symptoms of shortness
of breath and swelling of the ankles were typical and
consistent with the other findings and that it was evident that Johnson was suffering from "heart failure"
(Tr. 11-2). This diagnosis was further confirmed the
following day, March 17, at which time the doctor performed an electrocardiogram which clinically demonstrated fibrilla~tion of the heart (Tr. 10-11).
The doctor testified that Mr. Johnson knew that he
had some problem with his heart for some time prior to
the time he came into the doctor's office (Tr. 28). On
the occasion of the first visit on March 16, 1964, the
doctor told Mr .•Johnson that he was suffering from heart
failure; that the condition would be treated with digitalis
and that if "he would take it easy and not do the hard
work he could get by" (Tr. 12). The condition of the
mitral valve of the heart 'vhich was diagnosed was a
condition which prevented this imrJortant valve of the
heart from fully opening or closing. It was a chronic
condition and could not be treated by medication and the
only medical treatment which could be employed to correct the condition was heart surgery (Tr. 16).
Digitalis was prescribed to slow the heart to a normal rate and to give the heart mnscle a rest and permit
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it to build up strength. The initial prescription required
.Johnson to take certain dosages of digitalis three times
a day which the doctor described as strong dosages (Tr.
14). Dr. Noyes saw Mr. Johnson on five separate occasions in March of 1964. He testified that he talked with
Mr. Johnson about surgery to correct the mitral valve
problem. He testified that the first conversation about
surgery was probably in March of 1964 (Tr. 15).
Part of Dr. Noyes' deposition was published. This
testimony was to the effect that during the visits in
March, 1964, the doctor talked to Johnson about possibl<'
surgery; that he indicated that ,Johnson had reached the
time when he was getting symptoms; that "when your
patient begins to get symptoms, that is the time to have
surgery"; that "I told him to consider it"; and that
when Johnson came in later on (in October of 1965) he
said "he was ready for it" (Tr. 18-20).
Following March of 1964, Dr. Noyes did not see Mr.
J olmson again about his heart condition until October
of 1965 ·when Johnson came in again complaining of
shortness of breath (Tr. 17). The insurance application
had been made the month before.
The doctor saw Mr. Johnson on two occasions m
October and three occasions in November of 1965. The
doctor's diagnosis during these visits remained the same
and the patient was again treated with digitalis. In
FPbruarv of 1966, Dr. Noyes referred Mr. Johnson to
Dr. Roy. Kimball, a heart specialist in Salt Lake City.
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Dr. Kimball associated Dr. Jensen and in March of 19G6
Mr. Johnson was admitted to a hospital in Salt Lake'
City for surgery to replace the mitral valve of the heart.
Mr. Johnson died on March 30, 1966 following heart
surgery.
It was stipulated by the parties that if a Mr. vVilliam H. De Silva of the underwriting department of
Prudential Insurance Company were called as a witness,
he would testify that his department was charged with
the responsibility of reviewing applications for insurance and determining the insurability of applicants; that
the company relied upon the representations of Mr. Johnson on the application that was submitted; that the
company had no notice that Mr. Johnson had a heart
condition and that if the company had known that Mr.
Johnson had a heart condition or had known of Dr.
Noyes' diagnosis or had known that Mr. Johnson had
been treated with digitalis, that his application for insurance would have been rejected and that the policy
would not have been issued. It was stipulated that the
agreed testimony of Mr. De Silva be considered by the
court as evidence (Tr. 62-64}.
The trial court awarded judgment on defendant's
counterclaim for the benefits claimed under the policy
issued September 3, 1965 including life insurance and
hnspital and medical benefits aggregating $6,506.79 plus
interest. This appeal seeks reversal of the judgment.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
A.

Plaintiff is entitled to cancellation of Policy No.
W P2 510 001 for the reason that the issuance of thP:
policy was induced by fraud and rnisrepresP:ntation
of the insured, Clyde W. Johnson.

The evidence, without conflict, discloses that on September 3, 1965, Clyde Johnson represented to Prudential
Insurance Company in his application for insurance covPrage that he had not been examined by or consulted a
physician for a period of five years preceding the examination; that he had never been told that he had any
trouble with his heart; that he had not been in any institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or treatment for
five years preceding the application and that he had no
knowledge of any physical impairment or ill health.
Each of these statements was untrue.
Mr. Johnson knew that his application was false. He
had received extensive care for his heart condition the
wry year before. At the very time the application was
madP he was snffering from a serious heart condition
diagnosed as heart failure. He knew that it was incurable except by surgery; that he had taken digitalis
nndPr the doctor's direction to control it; and that he
had been told by the doctor that he must slow down and
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discontinue strenuous work in his business. The company
relied upon the application and the false representations
of Johnson and was deceived thereby.
The evidence as hereinabove recited, the uncontroverted facts as set forth in the pre-trial order (see
particularly Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, R. 51-52 and the
court's Findings of Fact, Paragraph 3, R. 57) conclusively show that the policy was obtained by deceit. Upon
the facts of this case, plaintiff is entitled as a matter of
law to cancellation of the insurance policy issued on the
fraudulent application.
Chadwick vs. Brneficial Life Insitrance Company,
54 Utah 443, 181 Pac. 448, also reported at 56 Utah 480,
191 P. 240, is probahly the leading Utah case dealing with
fraudulent insurance applications. In the Chadwick case,
the applicant ans,vered questions on his application for
insurance as follows:
Have you ever had any of thl:' foll°'ving diseases .... rheumatism or gout~
Answer: No.
Give name and address of physician last
consulted.
Answer: None.
Are yon in good health, so far as you know
or believe?
Answer : Yes.
At the time the application was made, the applicant
was suffering from a condition which had been diagnosed
as rhenmatism. The applicant's condition became pro-
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gressively worse after the policy was issued until his
death a few months after the writing of the policy. An
autopsy disclosed that he had died of tuberculosis of the
spine. The Utah Supreme Court held that the policy
was obtained by fraud and that intent to deceive was
established as a matter of law. The reasoning of the
court is reflected in the following quote from the main
opinion:
"If the insured at the time of making his application for a policy has knowledge or good reason
to know that he is afflicted with a disease that
renders his condition serious, and that thereby
his longevity will be prejudicially impaired, his
statements and representations to the contrary
in reply to specific inquiries constitute a fraud
practiced upon the insurer, and which, when successfully proven, invalidates the policy."

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Frick stated:
"\V"hile it is true that the deceased may not have
appreciated the nature of his disease, he, as the
undisputed evidence shows, did know that he was
seriously afflicted with some malady, and that he
had not only consulted doctors, but was being
treated bY them therefor. The evidence thus
stands un~ontradicted that the deceased did conceal material facts from the defendant, and it is
but fair, jnst, and right that the consequences ~f
such concealment should fall upon the beneficiaries of the insured rather than upon the defendant, and indirectly upon the policy holders."
. 'l'lw recent case of Thcros vs. 111 ctropolitan Life Insura nee company' 17 e tah 2d 205, 407 p. 2d 685, also
deals with the issue of fraud in insurance applications.
The insured had a history of past rheumatic heart a;sease
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which he failed to disclose on the application for insurance. The insurance company mowd for summary judgment. The District Conrt granted the motion for summary judgment holding as a maitter of law that the
policy was obtained by fraud and the Supreme Court
aff;rmed.
The beneficiaries of the policy contended that the
insured gave truthful answers concerning his health and
medical history; that the agent had incorrectly recorded
the answers, and that the applicant had not read he
applicaion before signing it. The Supreme Court held
that the applicant was bound by the application which
he signed whether he read it or not and that if he did
not read it, he was at least bound by "constructive knowledge" of the misrepresentations on the application which
was submitted to the insurance company. In so holding,
the court said:
"In order to def eat recovenT on an insurance policy because of misrepresentation in the application, the misrepresentations mnst have been made
with an intent to deceive and defraud the insurance company. However, such an intent may be
inferred where the applicant knowingly misrepresents facts which he knows would influence the
insurer in accepting or rejecting the risk. Thr
same rule should apply whne the ayiplicant knowingly, or with constructive knowledge, permits
such misrepresentations to lw snhmitted to the
insurance company ...
*
*
*
"It is also the majority rule that an insured is
under a dutv to read his application before signing it and ~vill be considered hound by a knowledge 'of the contents of his signed application.
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This is merely an application of fundamental contract law. While courts generally are inclined to
treat insurance contracts as special and do not
always vigorously apply all the principles of contract law, that tPndencv should not be allowed
to overrun the bonnds ~f legitimate exception.
"The facts here presented provide absolutely no
basis for applying any exception to the basic contract law. The record is devoid of any facts or
circumstances that would indicate or imply that
Theros was by fraud, accident, misrepresentation,
imposition, illiteracy, artifice or device reasonably prevented from reading the application before signing it. Therefore, he is, by law, conclusively presumed to have read the application
and his beneficiary is bound by the contents thereof. It therefore follows that the lower court should
be affirmed."
Plaintiff is clearly entitled to cancel the policy
issnPd on the 1965 application.
B.

The vrovis10ns of the policies is.med in 1957 and
1960 do not preclude cancellation of the 1965 policy.
(l)

The 1965 policy is a contract entirely separate
and indepPndPnt from the earlier contracts issued in 1957 a1id 1960 and must be construed
by its own terms.

Each of the three policies issued to Johnson was a
sPparate and independent contract of insurance.
The 1957 policy ~was cancelled in 1960. When the
1960 policy was issued there was certainly no question
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that the coverage of the earlier policy had been terminated. Had Mr. Johnson chosen to do so, he could have
maintained the 1960 policy in full force and effect rather
than obtain the benefits of the new coverao-e
offered by•
b
the agent in 1965. The agent explained to Johnson when
the 1965 application was made that the policy to be
issued vvould be a "brand new" policy (Tr. 46-47).
vVhen Johnson made the 1965 application, he had
no life insurance coverage or major medical coveragl'
with Prudential. This coverage was issued solely upon
the basis of the false application.
Each policy was issued on a separate written application. Each policy provided different and distinct benefits for a different premium charge. There is neither
argument nor proof that any of the policies contained
any provision for substitution or that the 1965 policy
was issued b.Y reason of any right which Johnson had
under either of the prior policies.

vVe find absolutely no legal basis for the court's
conclusion that the so-called "incontestable" provisions
contained in the policies of 1957 and 1960 "carried over''
and became effective provisions of the policy issued in
September of 1965.
'Vhen the case was argued before the trial court,
counsel for the defendant relied upon authorities dealing
with "substituted policies" and instances where one insurer had assnm('d outstanding policies of another insurer. See 110 A.L.R. 1139, 10.J A.L.R. 997, 85 A.L.R. 240,
29A Am ..J ur., R(•etion 1127 ...:\ "substituted policy" is a
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policy secured by the insured pursuant to a privilege
granted to him by the original policy. None of these
authorities even remotely sustain the defendant's contention or the conclusion reached by the court in this
case, because under the circumstances of this case, it is
clear that each policy issued by the plaintiff was entirely
separate and independent from each of the other policies.
Furthermore, the 1965 policy provided new and additional coverage of an entirely different character.
The 1965 policy must be construed upon the basis
of its own terms and conditions. This is basic contract
law. See e.g., Provident Life and Accident Insitrance
Comzmny vs. Kegley, 99 S. E. 2d 601, and Nielsen vs.
G<'neral American Life Insurance Company, 89 F.2d 90
(10th Cir. 1937). No provision of the 1965 policy bars
the plaintiff's action for cancellation of the policy or the
assertion of a fraud defense.
(2)

The so-called "incontestable" provisions of the
earlier policies do not by their terms preclude
cancellation for fraudulent misstatements in
the application.

The provisions of the policies issued in 1957 and
1960 which are relied upon by defendant provide as follows (R. 57):
"Time Limit on Certain Defenses: (a) After two
years from the date a person becomes covered
~nder this Policy no misstatements, except fraudnlent misstatem~,;ds, made by the applicant in thP
application for coverage of such person shall be
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~sed to void the Policy or to deny a claim for loss

mcurred after the expiration of such two year
period.
·

(b) No claim for loss incurred with respect to anv
person after two years from the date such perso~
becomes covered under this Policy shall be reduced or denied on the ground that a disease or
physical condition not Pxcluded from coverage by
name or specific description effective on the date
of loss had existed prior to the effective date of
coverage of such person." (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing provisions of the policies are not
incontestable clauses but rather "time limits" on certain
def ens es. These same provisions are contained in the
1965 policy (see Exhibit 1). The 1965 policy also contains a one-year incontestable clause as to the life insurance coverage (see "Incontestability" paragraph of
the policy provisions of Exhibit 1). The incontestability
clause has no effect because the insured died within
a period of one >-ear from the issuance of the policy.
There was no incontestability clause in the earlier policy
because it did not provide any life insurance coverage.
It is at once apparent that as to the life insnrance
and major medical coverage, there could be no possible
merit to the claim that such rn~w cowrage would he
harrf'd hy the provisions of any earlier policy since it was
nPw coverage issued in reliance upon the false application.

W <' now turn to the so-called "incontestable" provisions relied upon by the defendant which art- aetnall:
just "time limits on ccrtni11 dt·fpnses." These provisions
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do not bar the plaintiff's action for cancellation of the
insurance policy.
The "time limit" relates only to defenses and does
not purport to prohibit cancellation of a policy procured
by false and fraudulent representations.
Paragraph (a) demolishes the defendant's argument because it expressly reserves plaintiff's right to defend for "fraudulent misstatements made by the applicant in the application for coverage."
Paragraph (b) of the time limit relates to the scope
of coverage and not to the right to def end or cancel
for fraud. This paragraph by its terms is applicable to
restrictions of coverage or defenses based upon the
"existence" of a pre-existing physical condition and has
no reference or application to an action to rescind for
fraud or misrepresentation with respect to a known preexisting condition.
Looking to the merit of the position that the provisions in question constitue a bar to the plaintiff's action
or a bar to the defense of the counterclaim, here are
actually two questions involved: (1) do the provisions
h.v their terms bar assertion of the frand7, and (2) when
do the provisions become effective or, put another way,
when does the time commence to run with respect to the
two-,vear time limit? It is actually beside the point to
say that the provisions of he earlier policies "carried
01'er," because the 1965 policy contained the same provisions. From what has been said, we think it is manifest
that t>ven if the time limit was in effect, these provisions
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do not bar the right of the, plaintiff to cancel the policy for
fraud. The final answer to defendant's position however
is that there is no legal reason whatever why a 'time limit'
for the assertion of fraud should commence to rnn in
1960 when the fraud was not committed until 1965. Such
an analysis of the holding of the trial court brings into
focus the manifest injustice of the judgment below.
CONCLUSION
The policy obtained by Johnson in 1965 was issued
on the basis of his fraudulent application and plaintiff
is entitled to cancel this policy. The policy is entirely
independent of the policies previously written by the
plaintiff and must be governed by its own terms and
provisions. In any event, there is no provision in any of
the policies which bars the plaintiff's action for cancellation of the policies on the gronnd of fraud. The judgment
of the trial court should be reversed and the court should
be directed to enter judgment of cancellation in favor
of the plaintiff dismissing defendant's counterclaim with
prejudice and awarding plaintiff its costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT l\IACFARANE, JR.
YAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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